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THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONCEPT AVAILABILITY 
TO CONTRAST EFFECTS IN JUDGMENT
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Contrast effects have been reported in the judgments of a wide 
variety of stimuli, ranging from judgments of such simple stimuli as 
auditory intensities (Needham, 1935) and odors (Beebe-Center, 1929) 
to judgments of complex verbal stimuli such as attitude scale items 
(Hovland & Sherif, 1952), clinical test responses (Campbell, Hunt, & 
Lewis, 1957), and propaganda (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957).
The major concern of the present study was whether contrast 
effects such as those typically found in simple judgments in psycho­
physics are inevitable artifacts of the specific experimental proce­
dures traditionally used, or whether they are more general phenomena 
which can be produced by different conditions as well. Also, there 
was cause to suspect that the magnitude of the displacement in judgment 
which occurs in contrast might be increased if the conditions under 
which judgment is typically made were less restrictive. The major 
premise of the present study was that the magnitude of displacement 
which occurs in contrast is a function of the location of and the 
availability of conceptual categories which may be used in judgment.
1
2Contrast effects in judgment. Some of the earliest contributions 
to the study of contrast effects came from the field of esthetics under 
the label affective contrast (Bacon, Rood, & Washburn, 1914) and, 
later, under the label hedonic contrast (Beebe-Center, 1932). In 1914 
Bacon, Rood, and Washburn described affective contrast in this way:
The pleasure of an agreeable experience is heightened, if it 
is preceded by a disagreeable experience, and an impression in 
itself unpleasant may be felt as pleasant if a more unpleasant 
state has been its antecedent. In like manner unpleasantness may 
be heightened or even created through contrast with a preceding 
agreeable affective state (Bacon, Rood, & Washburn, 1914, p. 290).
The effects of the introduction of relatively extreme stimuli into 
a previously judged stimulus series have been reported in numerous 
studies. The results have repeatedly shown that when such stimuli are 
interpolated, judgments of the stimuli in the original stimulus series 
are displaced in the direction opposite the value represented by the 
extreme stimuli. This type of contrast has been demonstrated with a 
variety of affect-producing stimuli, including colors (Harris, 1929; 
Hunt & Volkmann, 1937), odors (Beebe-Center, 1929; N. Cohen, 1937), 
photographs of children (Hunt, 1941), the prestige of occupations 
(McGarvey, 1943), statements labeled as "fascistic" (Raskin & Cook, 
1938), and statements of moral offenses or undesirable social acts 
(E. Cohen, 1957; Hunt, 1941; McGarvey, 1943).
Although concurrent experience with the interpolated extreme stim­
ulus and the stimulus series being judged was assumed necessary for 
the production of affective contrast in early studies, it has been 
demonstrated that experience with a set of relatively extreme stimuli 
considerably in advance of the judgment of a stimulus series may also
3produce contrast effect. Beebe-Center (1929) found that experience 
with a set of pleasant or unpleasant odors two days prior to judgment 
of a series of other odors produced contrast effects in the later 
judgments.
Imaginary extreme stimulus values have also been shown to be 
effective in producing contrast. Hunt and Volkmann (1937) first 
instructed their subjects to judge the pleasantness of a number of 
physically present colors on a seven-point scale. Having completed 
this, the subjects were then instructed to think of the most pleasant 
color they could imagine and to keep that color in mind as represent­
ing category seven while judging the original stimulus series again. 
Apparently the most pleasant imaginable color was not represented 
within the original stimulus series for most subjects inasmuch as the 
colors were judged as less pleasant than they had been in the first or 
control series. These results are consistent with those from studies 
wherein the extreme stimuli used were physically present.
Harris (1929) found that the relative extremity of affect-producing 
stimuli interpolated into a stimulus series is a significant determinant 
of the magnitude of the contrast effect obtained. The magnitude of the 
contrast effect was positively related to the subject’s perception of 
the difference between the interpolated stimuli and the relatively 
neutral stimulus series used.
Studies in psychophysics have generally treated contrast as one 
aspect of anchoring effect. Using the term anchor to refer to any 
standard or reference point which an individual uses in making the 
comparison necessary for judgment, it follows that anchoring effect
4would refer to any effect on the judgment of a given stimulus or set of 
stimuli produced by actual or hypothetical experience with an anchor or 
set of anchors. The necessity for this broad characterization will 
become apparent as the various uses of the term anchoring effect are 
illustrated.
The original and, perhaps, still most frequent use of anchoring 
effect is to refer to the effects of the end-points of a stimulus series 
on "absolute** judgments of the other stimuli in the series. Volkmann 
(1951, p. 238), Eriksen and Hake (1957, p. 132), and others have indi­
cated that the end-stimuli are the major determinants of discrimination 
within a stimulus series. Absolute judgments of the end-stimuli are 
less variable, from the outset, than judgments of stimuli located toward 
the middle of the series. Moreover, intensification of the effect of 
the end-stimuli by a procedure known as end-anchoring (which consists 
of the introduction of additional stimuli which correspond to the end- 
stimuli) results in a reduction of errors in the judgment of the middle 
stimuli.
The pervasiveness of anchor effects in absolute judgments is demon­
strated by the fact that judgments obtained by Eriksen and Hake (1957) 
showed such effects even when the subjects were required to judge a 
series of hues which formed a circular continuum. Two groups of sub­
jects, responding with the number series 1-20 but differing in what 
response numbers were assigned to which hues, showed that discrimin- 
ability of a given hue depended in part upon whether it occurred toward 
what the subject considered the end-points of the stimulus series or 
whether it occurred toward what he considered the middle portion.
The process which occurs with the introduction of an anchor at or 
near the end of the stimulus series is known as assimilation. Gener­
ally, it consists of an expansion of and consequent displacement of the 
judgmental scale toward the category assigned to the anchor. Conversely, 
contrast is generally described as a constriction of and consequent 
displacement of the judgmental scale away from the value of a remote 
anchor. Both expanded displacement and constricted displacement have 
been demonstrated in experimental studies. Inasmuch as the remaining 
possibility, uniform displacement, has not been systematically investi­
gated, it will be discussed later.
According to Sherif, Taub, and Hovland:
. . . whether one obtains an 'assimilation effect' or a 'contrast 
effect' depends on the position within or distance from the orig­
inal series of the introduced anchors (standards). When an anchor 
is introduced at the end or slightly removed from the end of the 
series, there will be a displacement of the scale of judgment 
toward the anchor and assimilation of the new reference point in 
the series. When, however, the reference point is too remote 
there will be displacement in the opposite direction (^.e., away 
from the anchor), with a constriction of the scale to a narrower 
range (Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958, p. 150).
The above quotation is an informal statement of the general hy­
pothesis tested and supported in what represents the most extensive 
investigation of assimilation and contrast effects in simple judgments 
to date. While Sherif, Taub, and Hovland's (1958) study is more exten­
sive than its predecessors, it is similar enough to earlier studies in 
procedure to be considered a prototype of psychophysical studies of 
anchoring effects.
Essentially the same procedure was used in each of three experi­
ments reported by Sherif et al. In the first or control session of
6each experiment the stimulus series was presented by the method of 
single stimuli. In this session the subjects were instructed to rank 
the stimulus series, calling the lightest weight "one." In subsequent 
sessions each weight in the original stimulus series was presented as 
the second member of a pair of weights, the first weight being an 
anchor. Although the subjects did not report their judgment of the 
anchor, they were instructed to let the first member of the pair (the 
anchor) define their topmost (or bottommost, depending upon the experi­
ment) category of judgment. Thus, the subjects were to use the same 
numerical value for the anchor as that used for the heaviest (or light­
est) weight in the original stimulus series in the first session.
The original stimulus series used in the first of the experiments 
consisted of six weights of 55, 75, 93, 109, 125, and 141 grams. The 
nine anchors used were weights of 141, 193, 219, 244, 267, 288, 312, 
and 347 grams. The lightest anchor (which was identical to the heaviest 
weight in the original stimulus series) produced an assimilation effect, 
as evidenced by a progressively increasing frequency of use of judg­
mental categories progressively nearer the anchor. The remaining eight 
anchors produced the opposite effect, the magnitude of the contrast 
effect being positively related to the distance of the anchor from the 
upper end of the original stimulus series.
The second and third experiments differed from the first in that 
anchors were introduced at or beyond the lighter end of an original 
stimulus series. However, both of these experiments produced results 
which were in agreement with those from the first experiment.
7Similar assimilation, and contrast effects have been demonstrated 
in a number of other studies using weights (Sevan & Darby, 1955; Brown, 
1953; Heintz, 1950; Kelson, 1947; Rogers, 1941). Such effects have 
also been noted in the judgment of visual inclination (Rogers, 1941; 
Volkmann, 1936), visual number (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949), 
auditory intensities (Long, 1937; Needham, 1935), pitch (Koester & 
Schoenfeld, 1946), and time interval (Postman & Miller, 1945).
Studies in psychophysics which have reported contrast have gener­
ally restricted the subject to a number of judgment categories which 
was less than the number of stimuli presented. The subject is typically 
given practice (using the method of single stimuli) with a series of, 
say, six weights which he is to categorize using numbers 1-6. The sub­
ject is then exposed to an anchoring session (using the method of 
constant stimuli) wherein he is instructed to assign the value six to 
a weight (the anchor) which is much heavier than any he has previously 
experienced in the experiment. The subject must continue using the 
same set of six numbers for his judgments, though he now has, in effect, 
seven stimuli to judge. When an anchor which is clearly different from 
the six stimuli in the original stimulus series occupies category 6, 
judgments of the six stimuli must be compressed into categories 1-5.
It appears that constricted displacement of the judgmental scale would 
be inevitable under such circumstances. One experimental condition in 
the present study was designed to determine whether constricted displace­
ment would also occur when the number of judgment categories and stimuli 
were equal.
8A second concern in the present study was also related to the 
problem of the generality of the contrast effects thus far discussed. 
Rogers mentioned, as an incidental observation in his study of anchor­
ing effects in the judgment of lifted weights, that regardless of his 
instructions to define the anchor as six, "the O's occasionally assign 
to one of the higher stimulus-magnitudes Lanchorsj. a scale value higher 
than six. O reports a judgment of ’SEVEN’ or ’EIGHT’, and then immedi­
ately corrects himself, amused at the ’mistake’ he has made" (Rogers, 
1941, p. 25). Rogers' observation raises the question whether con­
stricted displacement in the judgmental scale would still occur if the 
subjects were allowed to define the anchor as belonging in a judgment 
category as remote as they wish from those used for the original stim­
ulus series. If constricted displacement is simply a function of the 
fact that subjects are not allowed to define the anchor in a manner 
which adequately describes the relationships among the stimuli, then 
the introduction of a remote anchor when it can be defined as the sub­
ject wishes should produce no effect on judgments of the original 
stimulus series.
Rogers (1941, p. 16) reported that his subjects experienced the 
original stimulus series as different when a remote anchor was intro­
duced. In the present investigator’s experience in studies of lifted 
weights, subjects have often reported that the original stimulus series 
seemed heavier after the introduction of a very light anchor. These 
observations inçily that some displacement might be expected even if the 
subjects were allowed to define the anchor as far removed from the 
stimuli in the original stimulus series. If the observations mentioned
9are correct, one might expect the greatest displacement to occur in 
the judgment of those weights nearest the anchor (i.e., constricted 
displacement) when, as in usual psychophysical procedures, new cate­
gories are not available which denote heavier weight than the cate­
gories previously used.
Incidental observations reported by McGarvey (1943) in a study of 
anchoring effects in the judgment of the prestige of occupations formed 
the basis of the third objective of the present study. McGarvey dupli­
cated the procedures used by Rogers (1941) in his study of anchoring
effects in the judgment of visual inclinations and lifted weights. 
Although her results with verbal materials as stimuli were in accord 
with those reported by Rogers, comments made by her subjects offer 
reason to question whether different results would have been obtained 
had it not been for the restrictions placed on the subjects' judgments.
McGarvey observed that with the introduction of more remote anchors 
to the stimulus series of occupations, "all of the subjects remarked on 
their dislike of the necessity of 'putting all these people who really 
don't belong together into the same category' and they constantly com­
plained that 'Six just isn't enough categories; I can't stretch it that
far except by putting everybody into the same category'" (McGarvey,
1943, p. 51).
The subjects' comments raise the question whether, instead of 
occurring entirely within previously used judgment categories, dis­
placement would include new categories if they were available beyond 
that end of the judgmental scale farthest removed from the value assigned 
to the anchor. Evidence suggesting that such displacement may occur has
10
been reported in a number of later studies wherein the investigators 
used verbal stimuli (e.g., S. Cohen, 1957; Kelson, Blake, Mouton, & 
Olmstead, 1956; Manske, 1937: Moeller & Applezweig, 1957; Russell & 
Robertson, 1947). It seems reasonable to expect also to find new 
categories used in the judgment of nonverbal stimuli, such as weights, 
if, when an extremely light anchor is defined as occupying the category 
previously assigned to the lightest of the original set of weights, the 
subject is allowed to shift both the lower and upper ends of his judg­
mental scale away from the value assigned the anchor. For reasons 
mentioned earlier, the same expectation would be plausible where the 
subject is also allowed to place the anchor in a category which is 
relatively remote from his judgmental scale.^
^All of the expectations indicated in the foregoing pages were, 
of course, predicated on the assumption that the difference between 
the anchor-stimulus and the nearest stimulus value in the original 
stimulus series would be extreme. It appears likely that most cf these 
expectations would have to be modified if the difference were noc 
extreme.
CHAPTER II 
PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES
The general hypothesis of the present study was that the magni­
tude of the displacement which occurs in contrast effect is a function 
of the availability (existence or non-existence) and location of pre­
viously unused conceptual categories. Regardless of how the anchor 
was defined, it was expected that displacement would be greatest in 
those circumstances where previously unused categories were available 
beyond that end of the judgmental scale farthest removed from the 
category assigned a remote anchor.
Before stating the general hypothesis in the specific forms appro­
priate for statistical tests, a few remarks about the experimental 
design are necessary. The experiment took place in two parts. The 
first part consisted of a control session wherein all subjects were 
presented the same series of five weights for judgment by the method 
of single stimuli. The subjects were then divided into five experi­
mental groups which participated in separate anchoring sessions (each 
of which presented a different condition of concept availability) 
wherein weights were presented by the method of constant stimuli. In 
each anchoring session the same anchor weight, for which no judgment 
was reported, was presented as the first member of a pair of weights.
11
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In. one condition (see j[ below) the procedure traditionally used was 
duplicated; each of the five weights in the original stimulus series 
was presented for judgment as the second member of the pair. In the 
other four conditions, the lightest weight in the original stimulus 
series was replaced by an anchor-equivalent which was judged. The five 
experimental conditions are described below. Accordingly, judgments 
were obtained when:
I. There was one less concept available than the number of stim­
uli to be judged (since the anchor-stimulus was designated as 
the lowest of the previously used categories).
II. The number of concepts available equalled the number of 
stimuli to be judged (including the anchor-equivalent).
III. Three additional concepts were made available as an extension 
of that end of the judgment scale nearest the stimulus value 
of the anchor.
IV. Three additional concepts were made available as an extension 
of that end of the judgment scale farthest removed from the 
stimulus value of the anchor.
V. Three additional concepts were made available as an extension 
of each end of the judgment scale.
The relationships of the five conditions of concept availability 
to one another and to the stimulus series presented are illustrated 
in Table 1.
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Table 1
Stimulus Series Presented and Concepts Available 
in the Five Anchoring Sessions
Experimental
Condition
Stimuli
Presented^
Conceptis Available
I A 4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
II A A'5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
III A A'5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
IV A A'5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
V A A'5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
^A represents the anchor (for which no judgment was 
reported). A' represents the anchor-equivalent (which was 
judged). The numbers 4-8 refer to the weights from the 
original stimulus series which were used in the anchoring 
sessions.
Hypotheses. The specific hypotheses for the various experimental 
conditions were as follows:
A. Judgments of each of the four stimuli of the original stimulus 
series located nearest the anchor (i.e., median judgments of 
stimuli 4, 5, 6, and 7) will be displaced upward toward 
category 8 in Condition I.
B. Judgments of each of the three stimuli of the original stim­
ulus series located nearest the anchor (i.e., median judgments 
of stimuli 5, 6, and 7) will be displaced upward toward cate­
gory 8 in Conditions II and III.
C. The median judgments of stimulus 8 will not change in Con­
ditions I, II, or III.
D. Judgments of each of the four stimuli from the original stim­
ulus series (i.e., median judgments of stimuli 5, 6, 7, and 8) 
will be displaced upward toward category 11 in Conditions IV 
and V.
E. Judgments of the four stimuli from the original stimulus 
series (i.e., median judgments of stimuli 5, 6, 7, and 8) 
will be displaced more in Conditions IV and V than in Con­
dition I, II, or III.
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F. The anchor-equivalent will be assigned a lower conceptual 
category in Conditions III and V than that used in judgment 
of the same stimulus in Condition II.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Subjects. Previous psychophysical studies have generally used 
the same four or five subjects over and over in the various anchoring 
sessions. In the present investigation 14 different subjects were 
randomly assigned to each experimental condition. Both male and female 
students from introductory psychology classes who were not familiar 
with the problem being investigated were used as subjects. In Condi­
tion I nine subjects were males and five were females; in Condition II 
eight were males and six were females; in Condition III seven were 
males and seven were females; in Condition IV nine were males and five 
were females; and, in Condition V eight were males and six were females. 
In all cases, only right-handed subjects were used inasmuch as the 
apparatus was designed for lifting with the right hand.
For reasons mentioned later, certain features of one of the 
anchoring conditions used by Sherif, Taub, and Hovland (1958) were 
duplicated in the present study. One procedural aspect of the study 
by Sherif et al. which was employed in the present study was their 
accuracy criterion for subject selection. In an effort to insure that 
effects found in the anchoring sessions were not a function of initial 
inability to discriminate among the weights, those subjects who were
15
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unable to attain at least a 50% level of accuracy in their judgments 
of the original stimulus series were eliminated. In the present study, 
the accuracy level was determined by computing the percentage of the 
total number of judgments which were in accordance with the instructions 
given in the first, or control, session. Since only the last 100 of 
the 300 judgments of the original stimulus series were considered in 
the analysis, the accuracy criterion was therefore applied only to the 
last 100 judgments. Assuming random use of the five judgment categories 
for the five stimuli, the accuracy level expected by chance would be 
20%. The probability of a subject reaching the 50% accuracy criterion 
by chance, as determined by chi square, is less than .005.
Apparatus and general procedure. One of the anchors and one of 
the series of stimuli used by Sherif, Taub, and Hovland (1958) in the 
study summarized earlier were duplicated (except for the size of the 
weight containers) in the present study. Two considerations were in­
volved in the selection of these particular stimuli : (1) the 41 gram
anchor selected for the present study had been demonstrated to produce 
marked contrast effects in the judgment of the other stimuli selected, 
and (2) the effects of the introduction of an anchor to the lighter 
end of a series of weights has been investigated in comparatively few 
studies.
The stimuli were weights presented in cylindrical containers 5.5 
centimeters in diameter and 9.6 centimeters high. The weights used in 
the control, or standardization, session consisted of what has earlier 
been termed an original stimulus series of 97, 118, 137, 153, and 169 
grams. For convenience, these weights are hereafter labeled as 4, 5,
17
6, 7, and 8 respectively.
In all of the anchoring sessions a 41 gram anchor-stimulus (for 
which a judgment was not reported) was presented as the standard in 
the method of constant stimuli. Following the procedure usually used 
in psychophysics, all five of the weights in the original stimulus 
series were presented for judgment in Condition I. In the remaining 
four conditions an anchor-equivalent (A') of the same weight as the 
anchor was substituted for stimulus 4 so that the stimulus series 
judged in these conditions consisted of weights A', 5, 6, 7, and 8.
The stimuli were presented in random order except for the re­
strictions that all stimuli appeared in the series an equal number of 
times and that no stimulus for which a judgment was to be indicated 
was presented twice in succession. Forty weights were thus ordered 
for the control sessions. Because the apparatus used was capable of 
presenting only 40 weights and because every other weight presented in 
the anchoring sessions was an anchor-stimulus, only the first 20 posi­
tions in the order were used in the anchoring sessions.
The order of presentation of stimuli was comparable across all 
control sessions and across all anchoring sessions. However, within 
each control or anchoring session seven different starting positions 
in the order were used. Within each control session a subject’s 
starting point in the order depended upon which of seven seats he 
chose at the apparatus. Further, since as the subjects arrived for 
the anchoring session they were asked to take a different position at 
the apparatus than the one occupied in the control session, each sub­
ject's starting point in the order in the anchoring session differed
18
from his starting point in the control session.
The apparatus used to present the stimuli was so designed that 
seven subjects could silently make judgments simultaneously. The sub­
jects were seated around a table, six feet in diameter, in such a way 
that each directly faced one side of a seven-sided enclosure which was 
mounted on a table top. A small opening aligned with a padded arm rest 
on each side of the enclosure allowed the subject to put his right hand 
into the enclosure. Elasticized cloth surrounding each opening fitted 
snugly around the subject's wrist and prevented his seeing the weights. 
The weights were lifted directly with the hand in a uniform wrist motion.
Judgments were reported by manipulation of a dial with the left 
hand. The dial consisted of a 4" pointer which the subject regulated 
through 90° on a numbered scale of 11 points spaced apart. A linear 
potentiometer attached to each pointer operated a pen on a Grass EEC 
recorder which produced a record of the response.
Three hundred weights were presented to the subjeccs during each 
session on a platform 4' in diameter which revolved within the en­
closure. Notches along the edge of the platform held 40 weights. In 
the event that a subject failed to return a weight to its proper place 
on the platform after lifting, a brass rod pushed the weight into the 
proper position.
A mechanical timer regulated the interval between presentations 
of stimuli, turned on a green light mounted on top of the enclosure 
when the subjects were to lift, turned the light off one second before 
the platform moved, and then turned on a motor which moved the platform 
enough to bring the next weight under the subject's hand. The motor
19
was turned off by a microswitch operated by one of 40 wooden blocks 
mounted on the platform such that one was opposite each weight. This 
microswitch also operated an electrical counter for the benefit of the 
experimenter and a solenoid which projected a brass rod into a hole in 
the platform to act as a brake which insured that the platform stopped 
in the proper position each time. Another similarly mounted micro­
switch turned the timer on again and the process was repeated. The 
apparatus operated on the following time schedule: The green light
which indicated that the subject should lift came on for 3% seconds,
1 second elapsed after the light went off, the platform moved for 2 
seconds, the green light came on again, and the cycle was repeated.
Thus, the subjects had a total of 6% seconds between presentations of 
stimuli, a time interval which they reported was a comfortable pace.
When the green light for the fiftieth judgment went off, an elec­
trically energized mechanical stepping switch shut off the moving parts 
of the apparatus and turned on a red light (which was mounted beside 
the green one) to indicate a rest period. Since there were 40 weights 
on the platform, the occurrence of the rest period after the fiftieth 
lift insured that the subjects would not start in the same place in 
the order after each rest period.
During the rest period a mechanical timer which was also energized 
by the stepping switch timed a 3% minute interval, at the end of which 
a buzzer sounded to indicate the beginning of a new series of stimulus 
presentations. After the buzzer stopped, the timer turned the apparatus 
on again, and the entire cycle was repeated until 300 stimuli had been 
presented.
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A calibration of the EEC record was obtained by asking each subject 
to turn his dial to each of the eleven positions successively. This 
required about two minutes altogether. Excluding the time required for' 
instructions, each session required 1 hour which consisted of alternate 
intervals of 6% minutes spent judging and 3^ minutes spent resting, 
plus 2 minutes spent at the end of each session in registering the 
numbers on the dials.
The experiment took place in two parts. Standardization of a 
judgmental scale by the method of single stimuli was the intent of the 
control session. At the beginning of the control session the subjects 
were shown the operation of the apparatus, were allowed to pass around 
and lift a 137 gram weight (stimulus 6) which they were told was "the 
middle weight in the series," and were given 20 practice trials to insure 
that each understood what he or she was to do. Twenty-four hours later
the subjects were exposed to the anchoring session.
Specific procedure in each experimental condition. The procedure 
for each experimental condition is adequately summarized by the in­
structions given the subjects. The following instructions were given 
in all control sessions:
This experiment is designed to determine which of two methods 
of judging is the more accurate. Today you will use one method; 
tomorrow you will use the other. Your task today is to judge five 
weights, in ounces, by assigning one of the numbers on your dial 
to each of the weights. You are to use numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 
for the five weights, calling the lightest one 4 ounces, the next
heavier one 5, etc. up to 8 for the heaviest one. Since the
weights are in a haphazard order, you will never lift the same 
weight as the people on each side of you. You should not look 
at your neighbors’ dial settings as you might be influenced to 
make a wrong decision.
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The instructions given in the five anchoring sessions, labeled
according to the experimental conditions they represent, appear below;
Condition I:
Today you will use a different method of judging. Though the 
time between weights will be the same as yesterday and though only 
one weight will be under your hand at any time, the weights will 
be presented to you in pairs today. Today, first one and then 
another weight will be presented to you as the second member of a 
pair of weights. The first member of the pair will always be the 
same weight and although you should not make a judgment on your 
dial for it, you should consider it number 4. Like yesterday, 
you are to use numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
The first weight you will lift will be the first member of 
the pair, the second will be one of the weights you are to judge, 
the third will be the first member again, the fourth will be one
you are to judge, etc.
Remember, you should make a judgment on your dial only for 
the second weight in each pair.
Condition II:
Same as Condition I except that the statement, "Today, first 
one and then another weight will be presented to you as the second
member of a pair of weights" was replaced by, "You will again have
five weights to judge but today first one and then another of the 
five will be presented to you as the second member of a pair of 
weights."
Condition III:
Today you will use a different method of judging. Though the 
time between weights will be the same as yesterday and though only 
one weight will be under your hand at any time, the weights will 
be presented to you in pairs today. You will again have five 
weights to judge but today first one and then another of the five
will be presented to you as the second member of a pair of weights.
The first member of the pair will always be the same weight so you
should not make a judgment on your dial for it. You may call the
lightest weight of the five any number you choose between 1 and 4, 
but you must call the four heavier weights 5, 6, 7, and 8.
The remaining instructions were identical to those in the 
last two paragraphs of the instructions given in Condition I.
Condition IV:
Same as Condition II except that the statement, "Like yester­
day, you are to use numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8" was replaced by, 
"Except for the weight you are to call 4, you may use any numbers 
you choose between 5 and 11 for the other weights."
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Condition V:
Same as Condition III except that the statement, "You may 
call the lightest weight of the five any number you choose between 
1 and 4,- but you must call the four heavier weights 5, 6, 7, and 8“ 
was replaced by, "You may use any numbers you choose from 1-11 for 
your judgments."
In both the control and anchoring sessions of all conditions the 
subjects were asked not to talk while judging and not to discuss their 
judgments during the rest intervals. As indicated earlier, as the sub­
jects arrived for the anchoring session they were asked to choose a 
seat at the apparatus other than the one they had in the control session.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Perhaps a brief restatement of the hypotheses would be in order 
before presenting the results. Hypothesis A stated that the median 
judgments of stimuli 4, 5, 6, and 7 would be displaced upward toward 
category 8 in Condition I. Hypothesis ^ stated the same expectation 
for stimuli 5, 6, and 7 in Conditions II and III, where stimulus 4 was 
replaced by an anchor-equivalent. Hypothesis £ stated that the median 
judgments of stimulus 8 would not change in Condition I, II, or III. 
Hypothesis D specified that the median judgments of stimuli 5, 6, 7, 
and 8 would be displaced upward toward category 11 in Conditions IV 
and V. Hypotheses E and F were concerned with comparisons between con­
ditions. Hypothesis E stated that the amount of displacement in the 
median judgments of stimuli 5, 6, 7, and 8 would be greater in Condi­
tions IV and V than in Condition I, II, or III. Hypothesis F indicated 
that the anchor-equivalent would be assigned a lower category in Con­
ditions III and V than in Condition II.
Although the hypotheses were formulated solely in terms of dis­
placement in the judgments of certain stimuli, the data were also 
analyzed for evidence of constriction (i.e., a reduction in the range 
of judgments in the anchoring sessions).
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In. order to increase the stability of the measures used, only the 
last 100 judgments (20 judgments of each stimulus) made in each session 
were treated in the analysis. Variance was also reduced by the use of 
the 50% accuracy criterion for subject selection which was described in 
Chapter III.
Inasmuch as responses in the end judgment categories were gener­
ally skewed, and since in some conditions (e.g., all control sessions 
and the anchoring sessions of Conditions I and II) the instructions 
limited the subjects to judgments of an ordinal nature, nonparametric 
statistics were used for the entirety of the analysis— a treatment 
which has been recommended by Salzinger (1956) as more appropriate 
than parametric techniques for the analysis of anchoring effects.
An overview of the results is presented in graphic form in Figures 
1-5, wherein the median judgment of each stimulus in the control and 
anchoring session of each condition is plotted (Table 8 in the Appendix 
presents the same medians in numerical form). These medians were based 
on the 280 judgments of each stimulus which were made in each condition 
(20 judgments by each of the 14 subjects).
The earlier mentioned distinction between constricted and uniform 
displacement is clearly illustrated by a comparison of the lines which 
represent control and anchoring session judgments in Figures 2 and 4. 
Constricted displacement is evidenced in Figure 2 as an increase in 
the steepness of the line which represents anchoring session judgments. 
Uniform displacement is illustrated in Figure 4 wherein the lines are 
almost parallel.
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Fig. 1. Median judgments in Condition I.
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Fig. 2. Median judgments in Condition II. In the anchoring 
session, stimulus 4 was replaced by an anchor-equivalent (A')-
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Fig. 3. Median judgments in Condition III. In the anchoring 
session, stimulus 4 was replaced by an anchor-equivalent (A').
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Fig. 4. Median judgments in Condition IV. In the anchoring 
session, stimulus 4 was replaced by an anchor-equivalent (A*)-
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Fig. 5. Median judgments in Condition V. In the anchoring 
session, stimulus 4 was replaced by an anchor-equivalent (A')-
Comparison of control sessions and comparlson of anchoring sessions 
in analyses of variance. No significant differences were found among 
judgments made in the five control sessions. Fourteen scores were ob­
tained for the control session of each condition by adding each sub­
ject's median judgments of the five stimuli. The 70 scores were then 
ranked and treated in a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance, 
which produced a probability value greater than .80 (H = 1.58; ^  = 4).
The anchoring sessions were also compared in a Kruskal-Wallis one­
way analysis of variance. Since the anchor-equivalent was not substi­
tuted for stimulus 4 in all anchoring sessions (specifically, not in 
Condition I), only the median judgments of stimuli 5, 6, 7, and 8 were 
added to obtain a score in each session for each subject. Tht- 4 
summed median scores for the control session were then subtracted from 
corresponding scores for the anchoring session to obtain scores which 
represented the total displacement in each subject's judgments.
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Analysis of the total displacement scores for the five anchoring 
sessions yielded a probability value less than ,001 (H = 24.61; 
df = 4).
Assessment of displacement in the anchoring sessions. Table 2 
presents the results of statistical tests related to all of the hy­
potheses except E and F. These latter hypotheses required comparisons 
of independent samples of judgments between the anchoring sessions of 
two conditions, whereas Table 2 presents comparisons of related samples 
of judgments made in the control and anchoring sessions within experi­
mental conditions. All comparisons reported in Table 2 were made with 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. A median was computed 
for each subject's judgments of each stimulus and the 14 resulting 
medians for a given control session, treated as scores, were compared 
with the medians for the corresponding stimulus in the anchoring 
session. The medians referred to are presented in the Appendix in 
Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, which pertain, respectively, to Condi­
tions I, II, III, IV, and V.
As Table 2 indicates, all of the hypotheses tested except that 
part of C_ which pertained to Condition I were supported. Thus, when 
the anchor alone or the anchor and the anchor-equivalent were intro­
duced, the median judgments of stimuli 5, 6, 7, and 8 were displaced 
away from the anchor in all cases except those involving stimulus 8 
in Conditions II and III, wherein no change was expected.
Judgments of stimulus 4 also underwent a significant upward dis­
placement in the anchoring session of Condition I (P <.005). Though 
hypotheses concerning the judgment of the anchor-equivalent and the
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Table 2
Comparisons of Judgments of the Original Stimulus
Series in the Control and Anchoring Sessions
of the Five Experimental Conditions
Tests of Hypotheses A, B, C, and D
Direction
Hypothesis Condition Stimulus of Shift 'pS. N^ P
Predicted
A I 4 Upward 0.0 14 <.005
5 Upward 1.0 13 <.005
6 Upward 0.0 12 <.005
7 Upward 1.0 14 <.005
B II 5 Upward 4.0 14 <.005
6 Upward 12.0 14 <.005
7 Upward 16.0 13 <.025
III 5 Upward 13.0 14 .005
6 Upward 3.0 14 <.005
7 Upward 11.5 14 <.005
C I 8 No Change 0.0 14 <.01
II 8 No Change 41.5 13 >.05
III 8 No Change 27.5 13 >.05
D IV 5 Upward 0.0 14 <.005
6 Upward 1.0 14 <.005
7 Upward 0.0 14 <.005
8 Upward 2.0 14 <.005
V 5 Upward 1.0 14 <.005
6 Upward 0.0 14 <.005
7 Upward 1.5 14 <.005
8 Upward 3.0 14 < .005
Note.— Comparisons were made with the Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test. All tests were performed on differences in judg­
ments of the same stimulus in the control and anchoring sessions. 
One-tailed tests were performed for all hypotheses except £. 
represents the smaller sum of like-signed ranks, 
represents the number of matched pairs minus the number of 
pairs whose difference was 0. The original number of matched pairs 
was, in every case, 14.
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stimulus for which it was substituted, stimulus 4, were not formulated, 
statistical comparisons indicated that there was a significant differ­
ence (P <.01) between the judgments of the two stimuli in each condition 
where both were used. In every case, the anchor-equivalent received a 
lower median judgment than did stimulus 4 in the same condition.
It was mentioned earlier that an analysis of variance performed on 
total displacement scores indicated that there were significant differ­
ences among the anchoring sessions. Further analysis of the total dis­
placement scores with the Mann-Whitney U test (a test for independent 
samples) indicated there were no significant differences among Condi­
tions I, II, and III or between Conditions IV and V (see Table 3). 
However, comparisons between the first three conditions and the last 
two indicated that there was significantly greater displacement in 
Conditions IV and V than in Conditions I, II, or III. Thus, hypothesis 
E_ was supported.
In both Condition IV and V there were a few subjects who occasion­
ally used a fifth category for the four heavier stimuli— an occurrence 
which could have produced a significant degree of expansion in the 
judgmental scale, had it been more frequent. In these conditions (as 
can be determined from Tables 12 and 13 in the Appendix) one or more 
of the "new** concepts (evidenced by median judgments above 8.0) were 
used by 11 of the 14 subjects in Condition IV, and by 12 of the 14 in 
Condition V.
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Table 3
Analysis of Displacement in the 
Five Anchoring Sessions
Tests of Hypothesis E
Hypothesi s 
Tested
Conditions
Compared
U P
E I and IV 37 <.01
E I and V 45 <.01
E II and IV 24 <.001
E II and V 28 <.001
E III and IV 26 <.001
E III and V 30 <.001
None I and II 60 >.05
None I and III 60 >.05
None II and III 98 >.10
None IV and V 80 >.10
Note.— Comparisons were made with the 
Mann-Whitney U test. Probability values for 
tests of hypotheses are one-tailed.
Hypothesis F stated that the anchor-equivalent would be assigned 
a lower conceptual category in Conditions III and V than that assigned 
in Condition II. In testing this hypothesis, the Mann-Whitney U test 
was applied to the 14 medians which represented the subjects' judgments 
of the anchor-equivalent in each anchoring session. Comparisons were 
also made between the other conditions in which the anchor-equivalent 
was introduced.
Table 4 presents the results of the tests. As can be seen, the 
hypothesis in question was supported. Judgments of the anchor- 
equivalent in Conditions III and V were significantly lower than 
comparable judgments in Condition II.
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There was no significant difference between judgments of the 
anchor-equivalent in Conditions II and IV (wherein the subjects were 
instructed to use category 4) or between Conditions III and V (wherein 
they could use lower categories for the anchor-equivalent). However, 
comparisons of Conditions III and V with Condition IV indicated a 
significant difference in each case.
Table 4
Analysis of Judgments of the Anchor-Equivalent 
in Conditions II, III, IV, and V
Tests of Hypothesis F
Hypothesis
Tested
Conditions
Compared
U p
F II and III 17.5 <.001
F II and V 0.0 <.001
None II and IV 98.0 >.10
None III and IV 17.5 <.002
None III and V 82.0 >.10
None IV and V 0.0 <.002
Note.— Comparisons were made with the 
Mann-Whitney U test. Probability values for 
tests of hypotheses are one-tailed. N = 14.
The results thus far presented may be summarized as follows: With
the exception of the judgments of stimulus 8 in Conditions II and III, 
judgments of each of the stimuli from the original stimulus series 
underwent a significant amount of displacement away from the anchor 
in all conditions. Inasmuch as the additional heavier categories pro­
vided in Conditions IV and V were generally used, the displacement was 
significantly greater in magnitude in these two conditions than in the
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other conditions. Similarly, when categories 1, 2, and 3 were available 
for judgment of the light anchor-equivalent (as in Conditions III and 
V), they were generally used in preference to higher categories.
Assessment of changes in the range of judgments in the anchoring 
sessions. A significant amount of constriction in the range encompassed 
by the median judgments of stimuli 4 and 8 was found in the anchoring 
session of Condition I. Fourteen difference scores were obtained for 
the control session by subtracting each subject’s median judgment of 
stimulus 4 from his median judgment of stimulus 8. The difference 
scores thus obtained were compared with corresponding scores from the 
anchoring session by the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. On 
the assumption that constriction would be found in the anchoring 
session, as in previous studies, a one-tailed test was made which 
yielded a probability value less than .005 (T = 0; N = 14).
In Conditions II, III, IV, and V, stimulus 4 was replaced by an 
anchor-equivalent; therefore, comparable difference scores for these 
conditions were based on the range encompassed by stimuli 5 and 8.
For comparative purposes, similar scores were obtained for Condition I. 
The results of the comparisons of the range of judgments in the control 
and anchoring session of each condition appear in Table 5.
A significant amount of constriction was found in Conditions I,
II, and III. Since there was as much reason to expect expansion as 
there was to expect constriction in Conditions IV and V (where cate­
gories 9, 10, and 11 were available), two-tailed tests were performed 
on the data for these conditions. No significant change in the range 
of judgments occurred in Condition IV or V. (In fact, one-tailed tests
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for expansion or constriction would not have approached significance.) 
Thus, the significant amount of displacement which did occur in Con­
ditions IV and V was uniform in nature.
Table 5
Comparison of the Range of Judgments 
in the Control and Anchoring 
Session of Each Condition
Condition P
I 4.0 14 <.005=
II 1.0 14 <.005=
III 27.0 14 .05^
IV 44.0 14 >.05=
V 45.5 14 >.05=
Note.— Comparisons were made with the 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.
^2 represents the smaller sum of like- 
signed ranks.
represents the number of matched 
pairs minus the number of pairs whose differ­
ence was 0. The number of matched pairs in 
each condition was 14.
^One-tailed.
One-tailed probability value computed 
according to procedures recommended by 
Siegel (1956, pp. 79-80).
®Two-tailed.
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was performed on 
the above mentioned difference scores for the three conditions in 
which constricted displacement occurred. The analysis indicated that 
there was no significant difference in the amount of constriction in 
Conditions I, II, and III (H = 2.93; df = 2; P >.20).
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The above results provide an answer to the question posed in 
Chapter I concerning the effects of having one less judgment category 
than the number of stimuli presented for judgment. Inasmuch as con­
stricted displacement occurred in Conditions I, II, and III (where, 
respectively, there was one less category than the number of stimuli, 
where there were equal numbers of categories and stimuli, and where 
there was an excess of three categories for the judgment of the anchor- 
equivalent), we can conclude that constricted displacement is not 
limited to conditions where the subjects are allowed one less judgment 
category than the number of stimuli.
Some conclusions can also be drawn concerning the effect of the 
category assigned to the anchor-equivalent on the displacement of judg­
ments of the four heavier stimuli. Apparently the category assigned 
to the anchor-equivalent, whether high or low, had no significant 
effect on the overall displacement of judgments of the four heavier 
stimuli (see the results for comparisons of Conditions I and II, I and 
III, II and III, and IV and V in Table 3).
One might, however, legitimately ask whether the category assigned 
to the anchor-equivalent affected judgments of some of the lighter stim­
uli, even though there was no significant effect on the total amount 
of displacement. If there was a significant effect of the proximity 
of the category assigned the anchor-equivalent, judgments of stimulus 
5 and, perhaps, 6 should have been displaced more in those conditions 
where the anchor-equivalent was defined as relatively high (Conditions 
II and IV) than in those conditions where it was defined as relatively 
low (Conditions III and V).
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Individual comparisons of the displacement in judgments of each 
of the four heavier stimuli were made for Conditions II and III and 
for Conditions IV and V. Mann-Whitney U tests performed on the two 
sets of 14 displacement scores for the judgment of each stimulus 
yielded one-tailed probability values greater than .05 for each of 
the four heavier stimuli (see Table 6). Thus, the category assigned 
to the anchor-equivalent made no significant difference in the judg­
ment of any one of the four heavier stimuli.
Table 6
Comparisons of Displacement in the Judgments 
of Stimuli 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Conditions 
II and III and in Conditions IV and V
Conditions
Compared
Stimulus U P
II and III 5 72.5 >.05
6 93.0 >.05
7 79.0 >.05
8 72.5 >.05
IV and V 5 82.0 >.05
6 89.0 >.05
7 92.0 >.05
8 76.0 >05
Note.— Comparisons were made with the 
Mann-Whitney U test. Probability values 
are one-tailed.
The fact that the category assigned to the anchor-equivalent had 
no significant effect on the amount of displacement in judgment should 
not be construed to imply that the actual physical difference between 
the anchor-equivalent and the other stimuli was of no consequence. A
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number of studies mentioned earlier (e.g., Rogers, 1941; Postman & 
Hiller, 1945; Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958) conclusively demonstrated 
that the amount of contrast obtained is a function of the physical 
remoteness of the anchor. The present study indicates that the amount 
of displacement obtained with a particular remote anchor and anchor- 
equivalent is a function of the location (and, perhaps, number) of 
concepts available for judgment of stimuli other than the anchor, not 
a function of the number or location of concepts available for judgment 
of the anchor. This conclusion is supported by the fact that there 
was a significantly greater total displacement in Conditions IV and V 
than in the other three conditions and the fact that there was no more 
displacement in Condition II than in III, or in Condition IV than in V.
The results of the present study also indicate that the presence 
or absence of constricted displacement is not a simple function of the 
total number of categories available for judgment. Constricted dis­
placement occurred in Condition III (where categories 1, 2, and 3 were 
made available as additional categories for the anchor-equivalent) 
whereas uniform displacement occurred in Condition IV (where categories 
9, 10, and 11 were made available for the heavier stimuli); yet, the 
total number of categories available in each condition was 8. This 
comparison indicates that the location of the additional categories 
was the significant variable in the production of constricted or uni­
form displacement. This same conclusion is supported by a comparison 
of all five conditions. The fact that uniform displacement occurred 
in Conditions IV and V indicates that the constricted displacement found 
in Conditions I, II, and III was a function of the limited number of
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concepts available for judgment of the four heavier stimuli, not a 
function of the number of concepts available for judgment of the anchor.
Comparison of the present study and an earlier study. As indi­
cated previously, except for the physical dimensions of the -weights, 
the present study duplicated one of the sets of stimuli used by Sherif, 
Taub, and Hovland (1958). The procedures were essentially the same 
in their study and in Condition I of the present study except for the 
particular numbers the subjects were told to use in their judgments. 
Sherif et al. used numbers 1-5 whereas in the present study numbers 
4-8 were used.
Comparison of the t-wo studies sheds some light on the failure to 
support that part of hypothesis £ which was related to Condition I in 
the present study. This hypothesis predicted no change in the judgment 
of stimulus 8 in Condition I, whereas the results showed a significant 
upward displacement. This finding appears to be in line with data for 
the same condition reported earlier by Sherif et al.
The data presented by Sherif et al. cannot be compared directly 
with the data thus far reported in the present study since they re­
ported only the percentage of use of each judgment category in the 
control and anchoring sessions, without regard to the stimuli judged.
In their study the approximate increase in the percentage of use of the 
highest judgment category (read from a bar graph presented by Sherif 
et al. [1958, p. 153, Fig. 3 Bj) was from 18% in the control session to 
36% in the anchoring session. Corresponding percentages for Condition 
I of the present study were 15.2% and 31.6%. Thus, the frequency of 
use of the highest category was, in each case, approximately doubled
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in the anchoring session. In the present study the increase resulted 
from an upward displacement in the judgment of each of the four 
heaviest weights. An increase in the frequency of use of category 8 
was demonstrated by 3 of the 14 subjects in judging stimulus 5, by 12 
of the subjects in judging stimulus 6, by 13 in judging stimulus 7, 
and by all 14 in judging stimulus 8.
The percentage of use of each judgment category in comparable 
control and anchoring sessions of both the present study and that by 
Sherif et al. is tabulated in Table 7.
Table 7
Percentage of Use of Judgment Categories in Condition I 
in the Present Study and in an Equivalent Condition 
in a Study by Sherif, Taub, and Hovland
Study Control Session Anchoring Session
Present^
(categories 4-8) 16 19 24 25 15 1 12 24 31 32
Sherif et al.^ 
(categories 1-5) 16 18 25 23 18 0 11 27 26 36
^Percentages were rounded and therefore do not always
total 100%.
^Percentages were estimated from a bar graph presented by 
Sherif, Taub, and Hovland (1958, p. 153, Fig. 3 B).
It appears that the results for Condition I of the present study 
are comparable to those reported by Sherif et al. A marked increase 
in the frequency of use of those categories farthest removed from the 
category assigned to the anchor (category 4 in the present study, 
category 1 in Sherif et al.) is evident in both studies.
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Implications o£ the present study. The results of the present 
study indicate that the extent of change in conceptualization which may 
occur with the introduction of a remote anchor depends upon the exist­
ence or non-existence of previously unused judgmental categories, or 
concepts, beyond that end of the judgmental scale which is farthest 
removed from the anchor. When previously unused concepts are not avail­
able in this location, change in conceptualization involves the in­
clusion of some of the stimuli under previously used, but different, 
labels (as was the case in the anchoring sessions of Conditions I, II, 
and III). When such previously unused concepts are available, change 
in conceptualization resulting from the introduction of a remote anchor 
involves the inclusion of previously judged stimuli under new labels 
(such as occurred in Conditions IV and V).
One implication of the results of this study is obvious. A change 
in judgment brought about through the introduction of a remote anchor 
can be maximized by making concepts available beyond that end of the 
judgmental scale which is farthest removed from the value of the anchor.
Another implication, perhaps not so obvious, merits further investi­
gation. Phenomena conceptually similar to the contrast effects reported 
herein have also been reported in studies of persuasion (e.g.. Kelson, 
Blake, Mouton, & Olmstead, 1956; Knower, 1935; Manske, 1937; Moeller & 
Applezweig, 1957; Rosenthal, 1934; Russell & Robertson, 1947; Wilke, 
1934). When propaganda advocating a position which is extremely remote 
from an individual’s range of attitudes or stand on an issue is pre­
sented, a mixture of phenomena known as boomerang effect frequently 
occurs. The mixture has seldom been reported in enough detail to
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permit more than very crude analysis; however, the main characteristic 
of boomerang effect is a displacement of attitudes away from the posi­
tion advocated in the communication. In some cases displacement is so 
extreme that new attitudes appear to be assumed in the process (see 
Knower, 1935; Rosenthal, 1934; Russell & Robertson, 1947; Wilke, 1934).
Attitude scales are so constructed that it should be possible 
in post-propaganda assessment to differentiate among constricted dis­
placement, uniform displacement, and expanded displacement (which is 
theoretically possible in contrast as well as in assimilation).
Further, with appropriate modifications in the instructions given, it 
might be possible to determine, in advance of the propaganda, which 
presently unaccepted scale items are, nonetheless, considered as fairly 
reasonable by the individual. In the terms used in the present study, 
perhaps the attitudes indicated by such items could be considered 
relatively high in availability. If so, the availability of such 
attitudes (concepts) farther removed from the remote position advocated 
by a communicator might serve as a predictor for boomerang effects 
which involve assuming new attitudes.
CHAJPTER V
SUMMARY
Typically, contrast effects have been produced in psychophysics 
under conditions wherein a series of stimuli was judged using one less 
judgment category than there were stimuli. The present study explored 
the generality of contrast effects across five conditions of category, 
or concept, availability.
A displacement of judgments away from the value of the anchor 
occurred in all experimental conditions; however, there was an important 
difference in the manner in which displacement occurred and a consequent 
difference in the amount of displacement produced in the various condi­
tions.
The experimental conditions and the general procedure were as 
follows: Seventy subjects were used, 14 in each of the five experi­
mental conditions. The subjects in each condition served both as a 
control group and an experimental group. Treatment was the same in all 
five control sessions; the subjects were presented a series of five 
weights, by the method of single stimuli, which they were to categorize 
with numbers 4-8. In the experimental, or anchoring, session an ex­
tremely light anchor weight was introduced as the first member of a 
pair of weights by the method of constant stimuli.
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In. the anchoring sessions of Conditions I and II the subjects were 
instructed to continue using categories 4-8 for their judgments. In 
Condition I the five weights which were judged in the control session 
were presented along with the anchor. Although the subjects were not 
asked to record a judgment for the anchor, they were instructed to con­
sider it number Thus, in Condition I there was one less category, 
or concept, than the number of stimuli presented. In Condition II the 
number of concepts and stimuli was equated by replacing the lightest 
weight in the original stimulus series with a weight equivalent to the 
anchor-stimulus. An anchor-equivalent was also substituted for stimulus 
4 in the other three conditions. Additional categories were made avail­
able in the three remaining conditions. In Condition III, numbers 1-8 
were available in the anchoring session; in Condition IV, numbers 4-11 
were available; and, in Condition V, numbers 1-11 were available. In 
each condition where the anchor-equivalent was used, it was judged by 
the subjects.
There were no significant differences in the total amount of dis­
placement among Conditions I, II, and III or between Conditions IV and 
V; however, there was a significantly greater amount of displacement in 
Conditions IV and V than in any of the other three conditions. In both 
Conditions IV and V, some of the "new** concepts which were available 
were used for judgment of the heavier stimuli.
Judgments of the three stimuli which were closest to the anchor in 
weight underwent a significant upward displacement in all conditions. 
However, displacement in the judgment of the heaviest weight was not 
significant in Conditions II and III.
44
A significant amount of constriction in the range of judgments 
(i.e., constricted displacement) occurred in those conditions in which 
additional concepts were not available beyond that end of the judgmental 
scale which was farthest removed from the anchor (i.e., in Conditions I, 
II, and III). Displacement was uniform in Conditions IV and V, wherein 
the **new” categories were used.
The location of the category assigned to the anchor, whether 
proximal or distal with regard to the concepts used for the other 
stimuli, had no effect on the amount of displacement in judgment.
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Table 8
Median Judgment of Each Stimulus in the Control 
and Anchoring Session of Each Condition
Condi tion
Control Session Anchoring Session
Stimulus Stimulus
4 5 6 7 8 A' 4 5 6 7 8
I 4.20 5.25 6.15 6.94 7.64 X 5.41 6.23 6.95 7.60 7.92
II 4.20 5.16 6.13 6.95 7.77 4.01 X 5.92 6.64 7.16 7.74
III 4.27 5.26 6.11 6.91 7.64 1.99 X 5.86 6.59 7.21 7.79
IV 4.24 5.20 6.16 7.04 7.67 4.01 X 7.04 7.87 8.81 9.33
V 4.28 5.39 6.23 7.02 7.76 1.85 X 6.86 7.78 8.65 9.20
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Table 9
Each Subject's Median Judgment of Each Stimulus in the
Control and Anchoring Sessions of Condition I
Sub­
ject
Control Session Anchoring Session
Stimulus Stimulus
4 5 6 7 8 4 5 6 7 8
1. 4.22 5.17 6.14 Ô. 97 7.59 5.40 6.50 7.03 7.50 7.83
2. 4.13 5.50 6.68 7.33 7.91 5.09 6.23 6.96 7.59 7.95
3. 4.13 5.05 6.32 6.90 7.67 5.32 6.00 6.81 7.59 7.73
4. 4.63 5.50 6.39 6.86 7.73 5.09 5.50 6.39 7.17 7.79
5. 4.03 5.19 6.03 6.79 7.33 5.25 6.23 6.88 7.17 7.88
6. 4.00 5.05 5.96 6.95 7.67 4.61 6.14 6.90 7.67 8.00
7. 4.09 5.67 6.00 6.96 7.67 4.86 5.61 6.63 7.30 7.91
8. 4.27 5.60 6.20 7.06 7.59 6.13 6.50 7.13 7.79 7.95
9. 4.03 4.96 5.89 6.07 7.13 6.10 7.00 7.67 7.95 8.00
10.* 4.41 5.25 6.60 7.39 7.88 5.14 6.00 6.60 7.32 7.91
11.* 4.06 5.05 6.10 7.00 7.70 5.94 6.86 7.17 7.95 8.00
12.* 4.50 5.13 5.90 6.50 7.03 5.79 6.33 6.94 7.67 7.97
13.* 4.93 5.59 6.27 7.12 7.88 5.27 6.13 7.00 7.73 7.95
14.* 4.33 5.19 6.17 6.89 7.67 5.59 6.22 6.93 7.50 7.91
female
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Table 10
Each Subject's Median Judgment of Each Stimulus in the
Control and Anchoring Sessions of Condition II
Sub­
ject
Control Session Anchoring Session
Stimulus Stimulus
4 5 6 7 8 A' 5 6 7 8
15. 4.50 5.30 6.50 6.92 7.83 4.03 6.40 6.90 7.30 7.83
16. 4.13 5.50 6.19 6.83 7.79 4.00 5.75 6.40 7.03 7.73
17. 4.03 4.94 5.80 6.79 7.50 4.00 6.17 7.00 7.59 7.88
18. 4.41 5.14 5.89 6.63 7.38 4.00 5.33 6.50 6.96 7.59
19. 4.59 5.09 6.12 6.77 7.59 4.00 5.89 6.06 6.95 7.50
20. 4.03 5.05 6.25 7.23 7.83 4.00 6.59 7.03 7.67 7.91
21. 4.21 5.40 6.10. 7.12 7.73 4.03 6.06 6.80 7.12 7.67
22. 4.09 4.72 6.10 7.00 7.88 4.13 6.00 6.92 7.14 7.67
23.a 4.27 5.41 6.92 7.25 7.88 4.00 5.94 6-38 7.30 7.67
24.a 4.21 5.59 6.12 7.08 7.88 4.00 5.33 6.00 6.50 7.28
25.a 4.06 4.96 5.90 6.50 7.59 4.00 6.03 6.67 7.27 7.88
26.a 4.03 4.88 5.67 6.90 7.67 4.00 5.17 6.50 7.23 7.83
27.a 4.50 5.50 6.39 6.96 7.97 4.00 6.03 7.00 7.67 7.88
28.* 4.50 5.25 6.33 7.10 7.83 4.00 5.75 6.23 6.77 7.67
Female
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Table II
Each Subject's Median Judgment of Each Stimulus in the
Control and Anchoring Sessions of Condition III
Control Session Anchoring S'ession
Sub­
ject
Stimulus Stimulu5
4 5 6 7 8 A' 5 6 7 8
29. 4.33 5.50 6.60 7.10 7.91 1.00 6.07 6.75 7.30 7.89
30. 4.13 5.10 6.19 6.88 7.91 1.00 6.10 7.03 7.91 8.00
31. 4.33 5.27 6.23 6.83 7.67 3.14 6.06 6.50 7.06 7.41
32. 4.70 5.86 6.21 7.33 7.88 4.00 5.50 6.41 7.30 7.67
33. 4.09 4.95 5.50 6.50 7.79 1.03 6.07 6.96 7.50 7.88
34. 4.06 4.95 6.00 6.50 7.20 1.00 5.21 6.50 7.00 7.91
35. 4.27 5.23 5.83 6.88 7.23 4.03 6.10 6.60 7.28 7.91
36.* 4.50 5.50 6.50 7.39 7.91 2.41 6.32 7.14 7.73 7.83
37.* 4.13 5.13 5.96 6.67 7.33 2.00 5.03 6.19 7.03 7.91
38.* 4.33 5.60 6.17 7.20 7.33 2.50 5.21 6.04 6.80 7.33
39.* 4.17 4.97 6.03 6.70 7.27 2.00 5.50 5.95 7.00 7.25
40.* 4.17 5.75 6.25 6.88 7.25 1.00 6.00 6.50 7.06 7.51
41.* 4.67 5.50 6.17 7.06 7.79 3.03 5.88 6.90 7.23 7.94
42.* 4.50 5.03 6.00 6.77 7.59 2.00 5.27 6.40 6.96 7.79
^Female
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Table 12
Each Subject’s Median. Judgment of Each Stimulus in the
Control and Anchoring Sessions of Condition IV
Control Session Anchoring Session
Sub­
ject
Stimulus Stimulus
4 5 6 7 8 A ’ 5 6 7 8
43. 4.33 5.33 6.14 7.19 7.59 4.00 7.39 8.36 9.32 10.79
44. 4.03 4.86 5.96 6.93 7.73 4.03 6.80 7.50 8.90 9.00
45. 4.06 5.38 6.50 7.79 7.83 4.00 7.10 8.50 9.05 9.88
46. 4.06 5.03 6.05 7.05 7.83 4.13 8.50 9.33 10.00 10.83
47. 4.13 5.00 5.93 6.27 7.25 4.00 6.75 7.67 8.41 8.95
43. 4.59 6.06 6.78 7.25 7.95 4.00 7.61 8.97 9.33 9.95
49. 4.50 5.25 5.94 6.50 7.27 4.00 5.33 6.14 7.10 7.38
50. 4.33 5.33 6.59 7.06 7.79 4.00 8.73 9.68 10.12 10.67
51. 4.17 5.21 6.68 7.59 7.91 4.00 7.50 8.20 9.10 10.17
52.* 4.50 5.06 6.00 6.68 7.36 4.00 5.61 6.60 7.03 7.89
53.* 4.41 5.21 6.03 6.78 7.40 4.03 5.41 6.00 7.07 7.27
54.* 4.13 4.96 5.89 7.06 7.73 4.00 6.27 7.06 7.83 8.73
55.* 4.43 5.21 6.09 7.00 7.41 - 4.00 7.28 8.17 9.67 10.79
56.* 4.41 5.25 6.50 7.33 7.67 4.00 7.80 8.14 9.21 9.68
Female
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Table 13
Each Subject's Median Judgment of Each Stimulus in the
Control and Anchoring Sessions of Condition V
Sub­
ject
Control Session Anchoring Session
Stimulus Stimulus
4 5 6 7 8 A' 5 6 7 8
57. 4.17 5.14 6.21 7.03 7.83 2.00 7.50 8.50 9.25 9.67
58. 4.50 5.73 6.70 7.30 7.91 1.00 6.27 7.00 7.86 8.41
59. 4.17 5.78 7.67 7.88 8.00 2.00 7.90 8.50 9.73 9.91
60. 4.27 5.68 6.14 7.14 7.40 2.06 7.14 7.86 8.72 9.25
61. 4.33 5.22 6.08 6.90 7.59 3.00 7.50 8.50 9.39 10.00
62. 4.50 5.33 6.27 6.63 7.41 2.09 6.50 7.86 8.50 9.07
63. 4.09 5.10 6.00 6.83 7.79 3.00 7.27 8.75 9.73 9.88
64. 4.17 5.63 6.28 7.17 7.79 1.00 5.50 6.39 7.08 7.73
65.* 4.33 5.50 6.10 6.83 7.83 1.00 8.50 9.41 10.38 10.79
66.* 4.27 5.21 6.09 7.03 7.67 1.00 5.33 6.33 7.12 7.30
67.* 4.17 5.28 6.21 6.96 7.88 2.00 6.06 7.17 7.88 8.83
68.* 4.63 5.67 6.27 7.00 7.67 1.00 6.75 7.43 8.38 9.07
69.* 4.41 5.33 6.33 7.00 7.67 2.00 7.43 8.38 9.28 9.83
70.* 4.27 5.27 6.25 6.90 7.67 3.00 6.06 7.12 7.90 8.50
^Female
